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Summary Judgment in the Federal Courts
Summary judgment procedure was first authorized for the Federal
District Courts in the Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Su-
preme Court effective September 16, 1938 as Rule 56.1 Previously, un-
der the Equity Rules, there was no such thing as a summary judgment.
2
The new procedure authorized the grant of summary judgment at the
instance of either plaintiff, defendant, or third-party defendant on a
"claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or (suit) to obtain a declaratory
judgment," and in passing upon the motion, the pleadings, admissions,
depositions, and affidavits may be considered.3
Save for several early attempts in Kentucky, South Carolina, and
Virginia,4 no common-law jurisdiction had an effective summary judg-
ment procedure until the English Summary Procedure on Bills of Ex-
change Act of 1855,' which authorized summary judgment in actions
upon negotiable instruments. In the Judicature Act of 1873 the remedy
was extended to include six different types of civil actions, 6 which re-
sulting provision was the prototype of many of the present state summary
judgment statutes. While the coverage of the state rules is not within
the scope of this Note, it is appropriate to observe that in many cases
the remedy is still more or less restricted to the types of actions enumer-
ated in the English Rules; 7 there are also additional limitations: e. g.
1. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DisTc CouRTs, Rule 56, pursuant to
the Act of June 19, 1934, c. 651, § 1, 48 STAT. 1064 28 U.S.C. §§ 723b, 723c (Supp.
1949). Before this time, in actions at law the Conformity Act, c. 255, 17 STAT. 197
(1872), required the local state procedure to be followed. District Courts in states
having summary judgment procedures in effect had available such a remedy.
2. Dempsey v. Pink, 92 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1937) ; cert. denied, 303 U.S. 648 (1938).
3. For a lucid discussion of the new federal procedure, see Ilsen, Recent Cases and
New Developments in Federal Procedure, 16 ST. JOHN'S L. Rzv. 1, 42 (1941).
4. Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 YAIE L.J.
193 (1928).
5. 18 & 19 VIcT. c. 67 (1855).
6. Actions to recover a debt or liquidated demand, on a 1) contract, express or
implied, 2) bond, 3) statute, 4) guaranty, 5) trust; and 6) actions for recovery of
land by a landlord against a tenant. Cf. RULEs OF THE SUPREME COURT, ORDER III,
RULE 6; ORDER XIV, RULE 1, ANNUAL PRAcricz 15 et seq., 172 et seq. (1943). See
Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423 (1928).
7. E.g., CAL. CODE CIVIL PRoc. ANN. § 437c (1941) ; CONN. PRAc. BooK, RULES
FOR THE TRIAL COURT §§ 52-57 (1934) ; DEL. Rv. CODE c. 128, § 4648 (1935) ; ILL.
STAT. ANN. c. 110, § 181 (Smith-Hurd 1948); MicH. Comp. LAWs §§618.9-618.15
(1948); N.Y. RULES Civ. PRAc., RuLE 113 (Thompson 1939); R.I. GEN. LAws tit.
LVII, c. 524, § 1 (1938) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-721 (1950) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5524
(1949). The following states have adopted the federal rules, however: ARiz. CODE
ANN. §§ 21-1210 to -1216 (1939); N.J. RULES CIV. PRAC. IN SUPER. COURT, RULE
3-56 (1948). The Wisconsin procedure is essentially as broad as Rule 56: Wis. STAT.
§ 270.635 (1947). For an excellent discussion of the various state provisions see
Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423 (1928) ; SHFINTAG,
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT (1941) (New York).
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which of the parties may invoke the remedy,8 and what matter may be con-
sidered by the trial court in passing upon the motion.9 Federal Rule
56 was unique in that all limitations upon the type of action and upon
the parties who may move for summary judgment were removed. As
amended in 1948, any existing doubt as to the propriety of a "partial"
or interlocutory summary judgment on the issue of liability alone has
been removed, 10 and in its present state the letter of Rule 56 permits any
party to any civil action to move for summary judgment at the appro-
priate time, and either a final summary disposition of the whole case or
an interlocutory order disposing of those issues of fact about which there
is no dispute will be made."
That the fundamental stimulus to the establishment of a summary
judgment procedure, and the granting of summary judgment in a par-
ticular case, is impatience with the dilatoriness of the legal process is
apparent. That the opposing force is the reluctance of the judiciary to
dispense with a complete trial in open court where there is any possibility
of validity of the opponent's claim or defense is equally apparent. Though
in some ways similar to the problem of removing a case from the trier
of fact, the court in adjudicating a motion for summary judgment is not
aided by the presence of witnesses subject to cross-examination,'" nor
may he be sure that all evidence which might be introduced upon a full
trial has been proffered. These and other similar influences have com-
bined to restrict the operation of Rule 56 in practice, though on its face
it is applicable to all types of actions.1 2 The purpose of this Note is to
investigate the effect of these restricting factors on the Federal summary
judgment procedure, with particular attention to cases decided in the
Third Circuit.
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
Rule 56 provides that summary judgment shall be granted for the
moving party "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law." While the phraseology of this test differs from those em-
ployed in the various state statutes,' 3 it is probable that no difference in
meaning was thereby intended.
8. The following states limit the remedy to plaintiffs: Connecticut, Delaware,
Michigan, Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia.
9. Most of the state statutes limit evidentiary matter to affidavits. See statutes
cited note 7 supra.
10. Rule 56(c), as amended.
11. Rule 56(d).
Ila. To the extent that depositions are employed there has been opportunity for
cross-examination.
12. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Rule, 56, 28 U.S.C.A. following § 723c
(1941) ; cf. HOLTZOFF, TE NEWv FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE COURTS 146 (1940).
13. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROc. ANN. § 437c (1941) (facts sufficient to present a
triable issue of fact); CONN. PRAc. BooK, RULES FOR THE TRIAL COURT, §§ 52-57
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Allegations in Pleadings.-The summary judgment procedure pro-
vided by Rule 56 was designed primarily for a state of the proceeding
in which there are apparent issues of fact raised by the pleadings. Other-
wise, the motion would be superfluous since Rule 12 provides for the
motion for judgment on the pleadings, which motion, being the survivor
of the common law demurrer, 14 assumes the facts stated in the attacked
pleading to be true.15 The object of summary judgment is to pierce the
veil of the allegations in the pleadings to determine whether there is
really a bona fide fact issue to be tried. Accordingly, as a fundamental
proposition it should be apparent that such allegations are not controlling
in the determination of the propriety of summary judgment.1
Most of the earlier decisions in the Third Circuit have recognized this
basic principle.' 7 There seems to be no possibility of confusion where
the answer and evidentiary matter's supporting the motion for summary
judgment set forth new matter which by definition has not been contra-
dicted by pleading or otherwise.19 However, where the movant's eviden-
tiary matter contradicts the allegations of his opponent's pleading, several
recent decisions have indicated that the contrary allegations were ipso
facto sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.20  These cases,
(1934), ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 110, § 181 (Smith-Hurd 1948) (facts sufficient to entitle
defendant to defend); N.Y. RuLEs Civ. PaAc., RuLE 113 (Thompson 1939) (facts
sufficient to entitle the opposing party to a trial of the issues) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS tit.
LVII, c. 524, § 1 (1938) (substantial question of fact in dispute).
14. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Rule 12, 28 U.S.C.A. following § 723c
(1941).
15. Cf. SHEINTAG, op. cit. supra note 7.
16. See Commentary, "Genuineness" of Issues on Summary Judgment, 4 FED.
RuLms SEav. 940 (1941).
17. E.g., Juniper Mills, Inc. v. Landenberger, 6 F.R.D. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1947);
Arens v. Arens, 72 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Norton v. Fairclough, 72 F. Supp.
308 (D.N.J. 1947) ; Dickheiser v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 5 F.R.D. 5 (E.D. Pa. 1945) ;
Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D.Del. 1943) ; Munoz v. Merchants
Nat. Bank, 49 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Pa. 1942); Allen v. Radio Corp. of America, 47
F. Supp. 244 (D.Del. 1942); Reid Gas Engine Co. v. Lewellyn, 42 F. Supp, 895
(W.D. Pa. 1942); Nieman v. Long, 31 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1939); Cf. Wilkinson
v. Powell, 149 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469
(2d Cir. 1943) ; Battista v. Horton, 128 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1942). But cf. Kent v.
Hanlin, 35 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1940), which seems plainly erroneous.,
18. At this point definition of terms is apposite. Throughout this Note the term
movant refers to the party moving for summary judgment; opponent, to the party
opposing the motion; evidentiary matter, the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admis-
sions, and answers to interrogatories introduced by the parties in support of or contra
the motion.
19. Hurd v. Sheffield Steel Corp., 181 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. .1950) ; Miller v. Hoff-
man, 1 F.R.D. 290 (D.N.J. 1940). For purposes of joining issue to proceed to trial
a denial of new matter in the answer is not necessary unless ordered by the court,
RULEs 7(a), 8(d). However this "constructive controversion" of new matter should
not suffice to raise a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment.
20. Leigh v. Barnhart, 10 F.R.D. 279 (D.N.J. 1950); e.g., Postel v. Caruso, 86
F. Supp. 498 (D.N.J. 1949); Alamo Refining Co. v. Shell Development Co., 84 F.
Supp. 325 (D.Del. 1949) ; Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Corp., 79 F. Supp.
362, (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; see Harris v. Railway Exp. Agency, 178 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1949).
it is submitted, are patently erroneous. Their genesis seems to be a dic-
tum in Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Co.,21 decided by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1948, to the effect that affidavits may not be
treated for the purposes of the motion to dismiss as "proof contrary to
the well-pleaded facts in the complaint." While it is not clear from the
Hart case whether the motion made by the defendant was to dismiss the
complaint or for summary judgment,22 it is submitted that the quoted
language is inapplicable to the latter motion. The text writers and the
overwhelming majority of decisions in all circuits support this view with-
out qualification.
23
Conflicting Evidentiary Matter.-However, if the opponent introduces
affidavits, depositions, or other matter admissible under Rule 56, which
present "material facts" at variance with the movant's evidentiary matter,
the expected result is that summary judgment is precluded. That it was
not the intent of the framers of the rules to substitute "trial by affidavit"
for the more conventional form is apparent, 24 and the decisions abound
with statements to the effect that the function of the court is limited to
the ascertainment of the existence of an issue of material fact, and that it is
not to try the issue of fact whose existence has been so ascertained.2
This is not to say that in any instance the opponent is saved from a
summary demise upon the mere introduction of an affidavit reiterating the
allegations of his pleading,26 or denying knowledge of the movant's case; 
2 7
but the fact that the truth of his affidavits is less probable,2 or that he has
failed to introduce statements of disinterested parties, 29 or that his evidence
21. 169 F.2d 580, 581 (3d Cir. 1948).
22. The circuit court states that the trial court, 73 F. Supp. 146 (D. Del. 1947),
decided only the motion to dismiss, and made no disposition of the motion for sum-
mary judgment. Nevertheless the case was finally decided as if a motion for sum-
mary judgment had been made, i.e., the affidavits and interrogatories were considered
to ascertain whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the threat of
infringement.
23. Cases cited note 17 supra; Kennedy, The Federal Summary Judgment Rule,
13 f3ROOKLYN L. REV. 5 (1947) ; Clark, Summary Judgment and a Proposed Rule of
Court, 25 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 20 (1941) ; Commentary, "Genuineness" of Issues on Sum-
mary Judgiet, 4 FED. RULES SERV. 940 (1941); SHEINTAG, op. cit. supra 24; 3
MOORE, FEmRA PRAcricE § 56.01 (1938).
24. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PSOCEDURE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTES AT
WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK 176 (1938); PROCEEDINaS OF THE CLEVELAND INSTI-
TUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 295 (1938) ; Cf. SHEINTAG, op. Cit. supra 40.
25. Sarnoff v. Ciaglia, 165 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1947); Toebelman v. Missouri-
Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1942) ; Zig Zag Spring Co. v. Comfort
Spring Corp., 89 F. Supp. 410 (D.N.J. 1950); Saddle R. Twp. v. Erie R. Co., 9
F.R.D. 252 (D.N.J. 1949); Norton v. Shotmeyer, 72 F. Supp. 188 (D.N.J. 1947);
Snyder v. Dravo Corp., 6 F.R.D. 546 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Chemical Foundation v. Uni-
versal-Cyclops Steel Corp., 2 F.R.D. 283 (W.D. Pa. 1942); cf. Ramsouer v. Mid-
land Valley R. Co., 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Miller v. Miller, 122 F.2d 209 (D.C.
Cir. 1941).
26. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1948).
27. Herzog v. DesLauriers Steel Mould Co., 46 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
28. Wise v. McCarty Aniline & Extract Co., 9 F.R.D. 170 (D.N.J. 1949).
29. Sarnoff v. Ciaglia, 165 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1947).
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is equivocal 3 0 does not authorize the court to grant summary judgment
against him.
Showing Necessary to Preclude Grant of Summary Judgment.-Im-
plicit in the expression "genuine issue of material fact" is a problem com-
mon to all procedural devices for removing a case from the considera-
tion of the trier of fact. That problem is the extent of evidentiary mat-
ter which must be shown by the opponent to preclude disposition of the
case as a matter of law. The test for summary judgment seems to be
analogous to that used when considering the motion for directed ver-
dict, i. e., whether enough evidence has been introduced by the opponent
that the trier of fact might reasonably find for him,31 and the decisions
in this and other circuits have recognized the directed verdict test as being
applicable to motions for summary judgment.3 2 Similarly, the courts have
been liberal in construing the opponent's evidentiary matter, resolving all
inferential doubts in his favor.3 3  The use of the directed verdict test has
been criticized, however, because in effect the judge would be ruling on
what he would do in a non-existent situation, i. e., a full trial in open
court.3 4 The problem also remains as to whether strict rules of evidence
apply to the parties' evidentiary matter, so that the "ruling is to be made
on the record the parties have actually presented, not on one potentially
possible," 35 or otherwise.
MATTER ADMISSIBLE ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56(c) states that affidavits, depositions, and admissions, in ad-
dition to the pleadings, shall be considered by the trial court in passing
upon the motion. To this expressed list answers to interrogatories should
probably be added.3 6 Rule 56(e) stipulates that affidavits should present
facts admissible in evidence and shall be made on personal knowledge by
30. Alamo Refining Co. v. Shell Development Co., 84 F. Supp. 325 (D. Del. 1949).
31. See Smith, The Power of a Judge to Direct a Verdict, 24 COL. L. REv. 111
(1924), for an excellent comparison of this test with that formerly contained in
N.Y.C.P.A. RULE 457-a, i.e., that the judge may direct a verdict when he would be
compelled to set aside a contrary verdict as against the weight of the evidence. As
amended by Laws 1949, c. 604, this section now reads, "The court may direct a verdict
when it would be required to set aside a contrary verdict for legal insufficiency of
evidence." See Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 N.Y. 241, 54 N.E.2d 809
(1944), for the interpretation given to the former version of § 457-a.
32. E.g., Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944) ; Hurd
v. Sheffield Steel Corp., 181 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Radio City Music Hall v. Unied States, 135 F.2d 715
(2d Cir. 1943) ; Ramsouer v. Midland Valley R. Co., 135 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1943) ;
Port of Palm Beach Dist. v. Goethals, 104 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1939) ; Miller v. Hoff-
man, 1 F.R.D. 290 (D.NJ. 1940). See Chadbourn, A Summary Judgment Procedure
for North Carolina, 14 N.C.L. REv. 211 (1935).
33. See Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir.
1942).
34. E.g., Firemen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 149 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.
1945).
35. See Madeirense do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399,
405 (2d Cir. 1945).
36. E.g., Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 160 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1948).
affiants competent to testify. From these provisions it would seem that
the conventional rules of evidence are to be applied by the courts in ad-
judicating a motion for summary judgment.3 7
Content of Evidentiary Matter.-Where the movant's evidentiary
matter is partially inadmissible under the rules of evidence, the courts
have nevertheless granted summary judgment upon such a showing if the
admissible portion was sufficient,38 though the acceptance of an offer of
such evidence at a trial is discretionary with the trial court, absent ob-
jection.3 9  A fortiori this rule should be applied to the opponent's evi-
dentiary matter for the courts tend to resolve any doubts as to the ex-
istence of a genuine issue of fact in his favor. Hearsay statements in
affidavits, 4° especially if the affiant is the proponent's counsel,41 have been
held to be faulty on motion for summary judgment, even if the proponent
was the defending party.4 2  The courts tend to invoke the tenuous rule
against "opinion" evidence, especially when examining the movant's
papers; for example, general statements as to the execution of an assign-
ment without accounting for eye-witnesses; 4 or as to the validity of a
collective-bargaining agreement; 44 or, in a declaratory judgment suit, that
the plaintiff "understood" he would be subjected to a threat of infringe-
ment ;5 or, in an anti-trust action, that the restrictive arrangements were
not illegal, 48 have all been held to be inadmissible. However, it has been
held that in a wrongful death action by a passenger's administrator against
the insurance company, a record of the testimony of the driver in his
criminal prosecution for manslaughter should have been considered,
47
though it would probably be inadmissible in evidence at a trial.48  The
37. The scope of examination allowed in depositions and interrogatories to parties
is not necessarily limited to matters admissible at a trial, "if the testimony sought ap-
pears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." See
Rules 26(b), 33. But at a trial only that part admissible under the rules of evidence
may be received. Rule 26(d). Admissions (Rule 36) need only be relevant and not
privileged; if not, objections must be made seasonably by the opposing party.
38. Cromwell v. Hillsborough Twp., 149 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1945); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson Veneer Co., 86 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. La. 1949) ; Dickheiser v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 5 F.R.D. 5 (E.D. Pa. 1945). This rule is necessary because
depositions and interrogatories as taken may contain inadmissible matter. See note
37 supra.
39. 1 WiG MoE, EVIDENCE § 17 (3d Ed. 1940).
40. United States v. Kehoe, 4 F.R.D. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1945).
41. Robinson v. Waterman S.S. Co., 8 F.R.D. 155 (D.N.J. 1948).
42. Seward v. Nissen, 2 F.R.D. 545 (D. Del. 1942); Thermo-Plastics Corp. v..
International Pulverizing Corp., 42 F. Supp. 408 (D.N.J. 1941).
43. Houghton-Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 113 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1940).
44. Walling v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 139 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1943).
45. Thermo-Plastics Corp. v. International Pulverizing Corp., 42 F. Supp. 408;
(D.N.J. 1941); cf. Chiplets, Inc. v. June Dairy Prod. Co., 89 F. Supp. 814 (D.N.J.
1950).
46. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) ; Associated Press;
v. United States, 321 U.S. 1, 6 (1944).
47. Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1940).
48. Whether the strict requirement of identity of parties at a former proceeding-
is necessary to satisfy the hearsay rule is debatable. Nevertheless the courts have-
usually insisted on it unless the cross-examining party in the previous proceeding was.
in "privity" with the present party opponent. 5 WIGUORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 1386-88 (3d:
Ed. 1940).
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court, embarassed by the rules of evidence, escaped by saying that the
technically inadmissible evidence should have apprised the trial court that
on trial the opponent might establish a genuine issue of fact,49 and ac-
cordingly a summary disposition of the case was inadvisable. Whether or
not this relaxation should be extended generally to exclude hearsay or
opinion evidence is doubtful; there are procedures in the Federal rules
which should enable the opponent to produce actual evidence in opposition
to the motion, °0 if he has a genuine claim or defense.
Credibility.-As the function of the court is merely to ascertain
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, it follows that generally
the court should not question the "credibility" of either of the affiants.
Accordingly, affidavits attacking the credibility of the opponent's eviden-
tiary matter should not be considered. 51 However, it appears unjustified
to hold that where the opponent submits no affidavits or other evidentiary
matter at all, to grant summary judgment on the movant's showing in-
volves passing upon the latter's credibility, and is erroneous because his
credibility raises a genuine issue of fact.52 To so reason renders the mo-
tion for summary judgment nugatory.
Ex parte Affidavits.-Theoretically, there is no reason why affidavits
or other testimony of interested parties may not be a proper foundation
for the grant of summary judgment. However, in Toebelman v. Missouri-
Kansas Pipe Line Co., a leading case in the Third Circuit, the court issued
a caveat to the basing of summary judgment upon such affidavits.53  As
the action was a stockholders' derivative suit for an accounting against
the directors for misspent funds, the resultant fact that the information
needed was within the sole knowledge of the defendants, and that dis-
covery had been denied below to the plaintiffs,5 4 may have justified the
court in issuing the caveat. It is submitted, however, that in the absence
of these complicating factors, summary- judgment may properly be granted
on ex parte affidavits alone, despite the fact that they are necessarily
hearsay. In theory such grant, depending on the existence of a "genuine
issue of material fact," is equally appropriate when the supporting matter
is affidavits of interested parties, if the opponent has advanced none to
49. Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940).
50. 50 E.g., Rules 26 (Depositions) ; 33 (Interrogatories to Parties) ; 34 (Pro-
duction of Documents) ; 35 (Physical and Mental Examinations) ; 36 (Admissions).
See Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: II, 38 COL.
L. REv. 1436, 1455 (1938).
51. Firemen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 149 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1945);
cf. Arenstein v. Porter, 154 F2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), 55 YAIX L.J. 810 (1946).
52. See Newark Evening News Pub. Co. v. King Features Syndicate, 7 F.R.D.
645, 647 (D.N.J. 1948), which seems to so indicate, though the action was for injunc-
tive relief under the Clayton Act, a type of proceeding in which the courts are very
reluctant to grant summary judgment.
53. 130 F.2d 1016, 1022 (3d Cir. 1942).
54. The district court appointed an accountant to examine defendant's books and
prepare a report, 41 F. Supp. 334 (D.Del. 1941).
create an issue.55 This controversy was squarely before the Supreme
Court in Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp.,5 6 in which the sole issue
was the market price of gas sold by plaintiffs upon delivery to defendant.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, filing the affidavits of eight ex-
perts who were privy in interest to defendant. While another factor in
the case was the reluctance of the court to allow a summary disposition on
the issue of damages, 7 the court also refrained from accepting as conclusive
the opinion evidence of defendant's experts. 58 Chief Justice Stone, dis-
senting,59 remarked that it was "unduly restrictive" of the summary judg-
ment procedure to deny the motion because it was supported by ex parte
affidavits, in view of the fact that plaintiffs had introduced no evidentiary
matter in opposition, and had not asked for a continuance to take deposi-
tions. 0 It is submitted that this latter view is preferable.
Parol Evidence Rule.-Adjudication of motions for sumary judgment
has not been free from the incidence of the familar rule of evidence ex-
cluding parol negotiations or representations from proof when the parties
have "apparently integrated a complete writing." 6 1 Where evidentiary
matter has been presented explaining that the description of land con-
tained in a deed was merely copied from an old deed,62 and that the
parties knew that the boundaries were different; or showing that a repre-
sentation granting an 18-month right of rescission was made; 63 or that
a down payment was not payable until the happening of an unexpressed
condition,6 4 the courts have received the parol evidence and held that a
genuine issue of fact was created. On the other hand, proof of knowledge
of an insurance agent where the policy contained a waiver clause,6 5 or of
alleged parol negotiations that were "intended to be the real contract of
the parties,"6 6 has been excluded from consideration. It is submitted that
the problem of whether to receive such evidence on motion for summary
judgment does- not materially differ from the problem of receiving it at a
trial, since presumably its admissibility depends only upon the integrated
55. Board of Public Instruction v. Meredith, 119 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1941) ; cert.
denied 314 U.S. 656 (1941).
56. 321 U.S. 620 (1944).
57. Id. at 623.
58. Id. at 627.
59. Justice Reed concurred in the dissent.
60. Id. at 631.
61. The parol evidence rule is without the scope of this note. See McCormick,
The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for the Control of the Jury, 41
YALE L.J. 365 (1932), for the procedural aspects; Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule,
53 YALE L.J. 603 (1944), for the application of the rule to contracts, conveyances, etc.
62. Miller v. Adelson, 4 F.R.D. 177 (W.D. Pa. 1944).
63. Merchants' Distilling Corp. v. American Beverage Corp., 33 F. Supp. 304
(D. Del. 1940).
64. Synchena, Inc., v. American Hyalsol Corp., 82 F. Supp. 685 (D. Del. 1949).
65. Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Woody, 47 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1942).
66. Russell v. Barnes Foundation, 50 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Pa. 1943), appeal dis-
ihissed 136 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1943).
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appearance of the writing. Those authorities adopting a more cynical view
of the rule, however, have roundly criticised its-application on motion for
summary judgment.
67
PRODUCTION OF OPPOSING EVIDENTIARY MATTER
Mere formal controversion of the movant's evidentiary matter by the
pleadings without more should not establish the existence of'a genuine
issue of fact and thus preclude the grant of summary judgment. As a
corollary to this proposition it follows that to preclude such grant the op-
ponent is required to produce enough evidentiary matter so that a rea-
sonable trier of fact might find for him. It is not surprising, then, to
find sprinkled throughout the cases statements to the effect that the facts
in the movant's evidentiary matter are taken as true unless contradicted
by opposing affidavits, 68 or that the opponent has the "burden" to contra-
dict the movant's case,69 or that his failure to file any affidavits or to move
for discovery "admitted" the movant's facts.70 Where the movant's
prayer for summary judgment is based upon new matter in bar of the
claim, such as the statute of limitations or res judicata, it would seem that
the obligation to go forward with proof to the contrary would be strongest,
for by definition the new matter has not been contradicted even by the
opponent's pleading.71 However, where the opponents pleading does con-
tradict the movant's evidentiary matter, in many cases the former party
was not rquired to come forth with contradictory matter.72  Of course,
where the movant's own depositions disclose a genuine issue of fact there
is no necessity for his opponent to come forward with matter in opposi-
tion 53 But where the movant's evidence is unequivocal, and uncontra-
dicted, the theory of Rule 56 calls for the grant of summary judgment.
Nevertheless, the courts often refuse such grant, probably due to the fun-
damental apprehension that a full trial of the case, with cross-examination,
might produce some genuine issues, or that the opponent should not be
"forced" to have discovery.7 4 One case has suggested that where the
67. Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943).
68. Juniper Mills v. Landenberger & Co., 6 F.R.D. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Geller
v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943) ; cf. Board of Public Instruc-
tion v. Meredith, 119 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied 314 U.S. 656 (1941).
But cf. Madeirense do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399, 405
(2d Cir. 1945) (dissenting opinion).
69. Radio City Music Hall v. United States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943).
70. Morris v. Prefabrication Engrg. Co., 181 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Wilkinson
v. Powell, 149 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Allen v. Radio Corp. of America, 47 F. Supp.
244 (D. Del. 1942).
71. Reynolds v. Needle, 132 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Carpenter v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 75 F. Supp. 732 (D. Del. 1948) ; see note 19 supra.
72. E.g., Chiplets, Inc. v. June Dairy Prod. Co., 89 F. Supp. 814 (D.N.J. 1950);
Robinson v. Waterman S.S. Co., 8 F.R.D. 155 (D.N.J. 1948) ; Greenleaf v. Brunswick-
Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1947). In Albert Dickinson Co. v.
Mellos Peanut Co., 179 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1950), it was intimated that verification of
the complaint might serve as an acceptable substitute.
73. Griffith v. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 4 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
74. Madierense do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399, 405
(2d Cir. 1945) (dissenting opinion).
moving papers include depositions, which give the opponent an opportunity
for cross-examination, the obligation to produce contrary matter is present,
while if the moving papers were limited to affidavits, the opposite result
should obtain.75 These and other reasons expressed for excusing the non-
production of opposing evidentiary matter will now be discussed.
FactS Which Might Be Proved At a Trial.-An oft-recurring expres-
sion of the court's reluctance to grant summary judgment to a movant
who has apparently established an uncontradicted case is that the opponent
"might" prove facts at a trial which could entitle him to recover, if be-
lieved. When the case involves the interpretation of a general word or
phrase in a statute or contract, such as a "required insurance policy" in
a financial responsibility law,76 or an "officer" of a corporation under the
Securities Exchange Act,77 or whether an airplane in which insured was
riding when killed was a "commercial" airplane within the meaning of the
policy,78 or whether baseball players are "temporary employees" within the
meaning of the Selective Service Act,79 or whether certain bank employees
are engaged in "interstate commerce" under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 0 it has been held that the opponent should have an opportunity to
prove facts supporting his contentions at a trial; though the opposite re-
sult was obtained in determining whether certain actors were "employees"
or "independent contractors" within the Fair Labor Standards Act.8 ' In
actions for the infringement of patents or trademarks, 8 2 for unreasonable
restraints of trade under the Clayton Act, 3 and for misuse of corporate
funds,8 4 a similar tendency to allow the opponent to go to trial has been
present. On the other hand, when the basis of the motion is the statute
of limitations, that tendency has been otherwise.8 5 There seems to be an
inclination in this type of case to grant or deny summary judgment ac-
cording to the persuasiveness of the movant's showing, though in theory
a "genuine issue" depends on whether any matter be produced in opposi-
tion. Those courts which do not allow a full trial reason that the motion
is to be decided on the record actually before the trial court, and not on
one "potentially possible." 86 Nevertheless, where the case involves com-
plicated or "vague" issues of fact the tendency to allow the opponent a
75. Radio City Music Hall v. United States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943).
76. Merchants Indemnity Corp. v. Peterson, 113 F.2d 4 (3d Cir. 1940).
77. Colby v. Klune, 13 Fed. Rules Serv. 56c41, Case 7 (2d Cir. 1949).
78. Grimes v. New York Life Ins. Co., 84 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
79. Reeser v. Philadelphia Nat. League Club, 84 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
80. Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
81. Radio City Music Hall v. United States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943).
82. Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1946), discussed
in Melville, Summary Judgmet and Discovery, 34 A.B.A.J. 187 (1948) ; Blum Adv.
Corp. v. Mayers Co., 25 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
83. Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa.
1947) ; Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 3 F.R.D. 356 (D.N.J. 1943).
84. Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1942).
85. Gifford v. Travelers Protective Ass'n, 153 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Reynolds
v. Needle, 132 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
86. Madeirense do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399, 405
(2d Cir. 1945).
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full trial has been strong. 7 Whether or not this reason is valid is prob-
lematical. The mere existence of a complicated issue of fact should not
excuse a complete non-production of evidentiary matter by the opponent.
On the other hand it should require an extremely liberal interpretation
of the matter actually introduced by him, giving the benefit of all possible
inferences from the evidentiary facts.
Facts Peculiarly Within Knowledge of Movant.-Another factor tend-
ing toward the denial of summary judgment is the fact that the relevant
evidence is peculiarly within knowledge of the movant. The operation
of this factor is understandable when it is recalled that the motion for
summary judgment may be made at any time after 20 days after the
commencement of the action.88 The opponent upon service of such a
motion is in a predicament if all of the relevant facts are within the
movant's control. The framers of the rules foresaw this situation and
provided in Rule 56(f) that if by affidavit the opponent states his reasons
why he cannot present facts in support of his opposition, the court might
deny the motion or order a continuance so that affidavits or depositions
might be taken or discovery had. It is to be noted that the opponent may
not remain dormant and argue at the hearing that he could not obtain any
information, but must present such matter by affidavit. In the leading
Toebelan8 9 case, the action was by stockholders for an accounting of
funds misspent by the defendant directors. The district court denied
plaintiffs' motion for a continuance but appointed an accountant to ex-
amine the corporate defendant's books and prepare a report, and granted
summary judgment for defendants.90 On appeal, it was held that plain-
tiffs' prayer for depositions and discovery should have been granted.9 1
It is submitted that this is the proper method of disposing of such a case.
Other courts, however, have been liberal in allowing the opponent to have
a trial, and apparently have not relied upon continuances to give the
opponent an opportunity to present facts. For example, where the issue
is the negligence of the movant's employees, 2 or the validity of the assign-
ment of certain copyrights to the movant,93 or whether the negligent
driver was operating an automobile with the consent of the insured,
94
or the plagiarism of copyrighted music by the movant,95 or whether the
movant's employees are engaged in interstate commerce,98 the courts have
held that the opponent is entitled to a trial. However, where the issue
87. Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Doehler Metal
Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945) ; see California Apparel
Creators v. Wieder of California, 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion).
88. Rule 56(a), as amended.
89. Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1942).
90. 41 F. Supp. 334 (D. Del. 1941).
91. Id. at 1022.
92. Robinson v. Waterman S.S. Co., 8 F.R.D. 155 (D.N.J. 1948).
93. Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 113 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1940).
94. Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1940).
95. Arenstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), 55 YALE L.J. 810 (1946).
96. Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
was the fraudulent concealment of facts by the majority stockholders, 7
or whether the movant's actors were employees under the Fair Labor
Standards Act,98 the movant was permitted to have summary judgment.
It is arguable that absent a bona fide showing by the opponent of the
necessity of taking depositions or affidavits, the court should grant judg-
ment for the movant. If the opponent has a real defense, it is probable
that he either has evidence within his control to establish that defense,
or knows where to get it by deposition or otherwise. The movant should
not be subjected to the inconvenience of a trial on the basis of some
vague hope or expectation that his opponent might construct a case out
of cross-examination alone.99
Conversely, when the evidentiary facts are peculiarly within the
opponent's knowledge, the courts have reasonably been less hesitant in
granting summary judgment. Thus, where the issue is whether notice
was given by defendant township of a tax reassessment hearing,10 0 or
whether defendant surety's lawyer had participated in an action against
the principal,10 ' or whether defendant had violated 0. P. A. ceiling
prices, 0 2 or whether plaintiff was barred by laches, 0 3 the movant has
prevailed. In view of the opponent's failure to proffer any evidentiary
matter when he is presumably in a position to do so, the courts are
usually justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present nor
would one be present at a trial 03 4
PARTICULAR CLAssEs OF ACTIONS
Though Rule 56 is applicable to all types of civil actions, its opera-
tion in several particular classes has been either furthered or impeded by
the inherent presence of the factors that have been enumerated supra as
tending toward the grant or denial of summary judgment. These factors
have particularly affected proceedings for review and enforcement of ad-
ministrative orders, under the Anti-trust Acts, and for infringement of
patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
Review and Enforcement of Administrative Orders.-Summary judg-
ment is particularly adapted to the review of administrative orders because
there has already been a hearing of the case. Since the courts are bound
97. Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943).
98. Radio City Music Hall v. United States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943).
99. Arenstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (dissenting opinion); cf.
Peckham v. Ronrico Corp., 7 F.R.D. 324 (D. Puerto Rico 1947); 61 Hagv. L. RFv.
375 (1947).
100. Cromwell v. Hillsborough Twp., 56 F. Supp. 41 (D.N.J. 1944), aff'd, 149
F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
101. Herzog v. DesLauriers Steel Mould Co., 46 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
102. Schreffler v. Bowles, 153 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied 328 U.S. 820
(1946), discussed in Melville, Summary Judgmentt and Discovery, 34 A.B.A.J. 187
(1948).
103. Dixon v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 159 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1947).
103a. Montmarquet v. Johnson & Johnson, 82 F. Supp. 469 (D.N.J. 1949), aff'd
179 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. granted 18 U.S.L. WEai 3307 (U.S. April 19, 1950).
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to lend "great weight" to the findings of the administrative body,10 4 or
the decision is purely "discretionary" and not reviewable unless there was
"fraud" in its procurement, 10 5 or the courts are bound to affirm the order
if there was "substantial evidence" to support it,10 6 there is frequently no
genuine issue of fact because no evidence is acceptable outside of the
record of the administrative hearing, unless it is to show that the order was
made "without jurisdiction." 107 But where there are additional issues
as to the willfulness of rent overcharges, 08 or as to the granting of an in-
junction because of repeated violations of the statute,10 9 summary judg-
ment as to these additional issues has been denied. Courts in general have
been wary of a summary disposition of cases where the state of mind of
the opponent is in issue.
Anti-Trust Suits.-Anti-Trust Suits involve complicated issues of
fact, knowledge of which is usually restricted to the defendants. That
being the case, the courts have usually denied summary judgment when
the movant is the alleged violator. It has been held, for example, that
a license agreement not objectionable on its face might be shown to be
restrictive at a trial,"10 or the exclusion of the opponent from a billiards
tournament might be shown unjustified."' However, it has also been ob-
served that there is no reason why summary judgment procedure is in-
apposite to anti-trust actions; 112 and, where for example, the defendants
admitted the alleged restrictive arrangements, but defended the legality
thereof, judgment was granted for the United States, because the admitted
contracts were "unreasonable per se." 113 This latter label seems to be
104. Bowles v. Ward, 65 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
105. New Jersey Worsted Mills v. Gnichtel, 31 F. Supp. 908 (D.N.J. 1940).
106. Wawa Dairy Farms v. Wickard, 56 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1944), aff'd
149 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1945) ; Woods v. Mikelberg, 80 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Pa. 1948) ;
National Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). In
Hennessey v. Federal Security Admr., 88 F. Supp. 664 (D. Conn. 1949), summary
judgment was granted to the plaintiff, after defendant had moved therefor, despite the
absence of a cross-motion.
107. Pinkus v. Reilly, 71 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.J. 1947); aff'd 170 F.2d 786 (3d
Cir. 1948), aff'o! without prejudice to re-open proceeding 70 S.Ct. 110 (1949) (irreg-
ularities in administrative proceeding).
108. Woods v. Mertes, 9 F.R.D. 318 (D. Del. 1949) ; Woods v. Contestabile, 81
F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1949) ; Creedon v. Evangelista, 77 F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Pa.
1948) ; Bates v. McClees, 76 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1948) ; Fleming v. Dorsey, 72
F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
109. Woods v. Wallace, 8 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1948). But cf. Woods v.
Mikelberg, 80 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
110. Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 3 F.R.D. 256 (D.N.J. 1943).
In Newark Evening News Pub. Co. v. King Features Syndicate, 7 F.R.D. 645 (D.N.J.
1948), summary judgment was denied to the complainants, even though no evidentiary
matter was introduced by the alleged violators, indicating a reluctance to grant sum-
mary judgment in this type of case at the instance of either party.
111. Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa.
1947).
112. E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 6 (1944) ; United States
v. General Instrument Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157 (D.N.J. 1949).
113. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
another device used to restrict the evidence that will be received, anal-
ogous to the parol evidence rule, and thus in effect to say that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, though there may be an issue of fact.
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks.-Similarly, in actions involv-
ing the scope, validity, or infringement of patents, copyrights, and trade-
marks, the complexity of the fact issues militates against the grant of
summary judgment. Those cases denying summary judgment have done
so regardless of the fact that the opponent has proffered no evidentiary
matter, usually on the broad ground that the interpretation of patents or
copyrights, or the exclusive right to a trade name presents too complex
a fact issue to be decided on motion for summary judgment,114 or on a
reluctance to posit the result on a comparison of the patented or copy-
righted product with the alleged infringing product without a full trial.",5
One case went so far as to hold that the opponent is not even required to
specify his claims of infringement."06 While it is to be observed that
the complexity of the factual issues and the necessity of expert testimony
are valid reasons for a reluctance to grant summary judgment unless
the absence of a genuine fact issue is absolutely clear, the same factors
also render it easier to assert a groundless claim or defense in the hope
of an out-of-court settlement. It is submitted that on motion for summary
judgment in this type of case the opponent ought at least be required to
specify instances of infringement or to establish a degree of similarity be-
tween the patented and infringing products which prima facie lends con-
crete support to the charges.
The establishment of a "justiciable controversy" sufficient to grant the
court jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment suit to establish lack of in-
fringement has been a concurrent problem in patent cases. Especially in
the later cases, a reluctance to summarily dispose of the case because the
opponent has not proved a direct charge of infringement by the movant
has been shown." 7 Whether or not this reluctance is justified is problem-
114. Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Burt v.
Bilofsky, 9 F.R.D. 299 (D.N.J. 1949); Union Nat. Bank v. Superior Steel Corp., 9
F.R.D. 123 (W.D. Pa. 1949); Chemicol Foundation, Inc. v. Universal-Cyclops Steel
Corp., 2 F.R.D. 283 (W.D. Pa. 1942); Reiser v. McKee Glass Co., 1 F.R.D. 170
(W.D. Pa. 1940); cf. Lipson v. Interstate Home Equipment Co., 57 F. Supp. 955
(D. Del. 1942). But cf. Allen v. Radio Corp. of America, 47 F. Supp. 244 (D. Del.
1942). However, there is no reason why summary judgment is not applicable to this
type of proceeding. Allen v. Radio Corp., .upra; see Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Bost-
wick Labs., 181 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1950); Houghton Miffin Co. v. Stackpole Sons,
Inc., 113 F.2d 627, 628 (2d Cir. 1940) ; and there is no "presumption of validity" from
the mere grant of the patent as will preclude summary judgment. Juniper Mills, Inc.
v. Landberger, 6 F.R.D. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
115. Albert Dickinson Co. v. Mellos Peanut Co., 179 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1950);
Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Arenstein v. Por-
ter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) ; 55 YALE L.J. 810 (1946).
116. Blum Adv. Corp. v. L. & C. Mayers Corp., 25 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
117. Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1948) ;
Alamo Ref. Co. v. Shell Development Co., 84 F. Supp. 325 (D. Del. 1949) ; Crosley
Corp. v. Hazeltine, 66 F. Supp. 893 (D. Del. 1946) ; Latrobe Electric Steel Co. v.
Vascoloy-Ramet Corp., 56 F. Supp. 37 (D. Del. 1944). But cf. Thermo-Plastics
Corp. v. International Pulverizing Corp., 42 F. Supp. 408 (D.N.J. 1941).
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atical. The courts ought to insist that the opponent establish an actual
threat before he will be allowed to have a trial, because the existence of
such a threat is a matter within his own knowledge; accordingly he should
be expected to prove it on motion for summary judgment.
DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN RULES 12 AND 56
Rule 12, which provided for motions to dismiss"118 and for judgment
on the pleadings, 119 formerly made no allovance for cases in which the
motions were so labeled by the movant, but in which such evidentiary
matter outside the pleadings as would be appropriate on a motion for
summary judgment was received by the court. A justifiable hesistancy
to deny the motion on the face of the pleadings alone when the evidentiary
matter disclosed no "genuine issue of material fact" was expressed by
many courts,120 for the label annexed by the movant should not be the
determinant, 121 and it was held that the court should treat the case as if
a motion for summary judgment had been made. This practice has been
codified in Rule 12 (b), as amended, which now makes it mandatory that
the court treat the motion as for summary judgment if the extraneous
evidentiary matter is "not excluded," and provides that all parties shall
have an opportunity to have discovery and take affidavits.
22
The leading case of Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp.,
12
decided in the District Court prior to the effective date of the amendment
to Rule 12, has been the source of some confusion in this respect. In that
case the issue was the existence of a threat of infringement of the defend-
ant's patents. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis of
affidavits and answers to interrogatories introduced by both parties al-
legedly showing the lack of such threat, and also moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss but "made no
disposition of the motion for summary judgment." 124 On appeal, the Cir-
cuit Court held that the complaint was improperly dismissed as a genuine
issue of fact was presented as to whether a threat of infringement had been
made. The result was probably correct in view of the content of the evi-
dentiary matter, but a dictum stated that an affidavit can not for purposes
of the motion to dismiss be treated as "proof contrary to the well-pleaded
118. Rule 12(b), as amended.
119. Rule 12(t).
120. E.g., Victory v. Manning, 128 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1942); Gallup v. Caldwell,
120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Central Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch, 116 F.2d
85 (2d Cir. 1940). See Note, Speaking Motions Under New Federal Rule 12(b) (6),
9 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 174 (1940); Commentary, The Speaking Motion, 6 FED.
RuLES SERV. 741 (1943).
121. Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942) ; cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943) ; see Pike, Current Trends in the Construction of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 CAL. ST. BAR J. 152 (1941).
122. See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Rule 12, U.S. CoDE CONG.
SE v., 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2322 (1946) ; Clark, Experience Under the Anendmzents to
the Federal Rides of Civil Procedure, 8 F.R.D. 497, 501 (1949).
123. 169 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1948).
124. 73 F. Supp. 146 (D. Del. 1947).
facts in the complaint." 125 While technically correct prior to the amend-
ment of Rule 12(b), under the present practice this dictum is misleading,
for if the court receives extraneous evidentiary matter it is bound to de-
cide the "motion to dismiss" as a motion for summary judgment; and as
has been submitted, the allegations of the complaint, even if "well pleaded,"
should not establish a genuine issue of fact without outside support.
Nevertheless, the district courts have cited the Hart dictum extensively
and have refrained from disposing of motions to dismiss according to the
amendment, 26 and this view seems to be supported by the circuit court,
which expressed a fear that "adjudication" of allegations in pleadings prior
to trial and the "resolving of the issues of fact" at that time would lead to
a necessity for "pre-pre-trial procedures." 127 It is submitted that this dire
consequence will never materialize if the proper function of the trial court
on motion for summary judgment is followed, i. e. to decide only whether
there are bona fide issues of fact to be tried.
"PARTIAL" SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56(d) provides that whenever the court does not "render judg-
ment" on the whole case on motion for summary judgment, a pre-trial
order must be made specifying the facts that appear to be uncontradicted
and the facts upon which a genuine issue exists. That this practice is
analogous to the permissive pre-trial practice of Rule 16, except that it is
mandatory, has been recognized by the courts.128  Some text writers
have contended that the label "partial summary judgment" is erroneous 120
as the decision is a mere interlocutory order and is not appealable, even if
the only issue remaining to be tried is damages.'3 0 At any rate, it is
clear that the same considerations as affect the grant or denial of summary
judgment of the whole case necessarily apply to a summary disposition of
only part of the issues; and where part of the relief demanded is punitive
damages or an injunction, the courts have usually declined to summarily
dispose of those issues, but have only so disposed of the issue of lia-
bility.'3 1
125. 169 F.2d at 581.
126. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co., 8 F.R.D. 349 (D.N.J.
1948) (containing an illuminating discussion of the problem), aff'd 176 F2d 90 (3d
Cir. 1949); Pittston-Luzerne Corp. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 800 (M.D. Pa.
1949); Alamo Refining Co. v. Shell Development Co., 84 F. Supp. 325 (D. Del.
1949); Michel v. Meier, 8 F.R.D. 464 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
127. Reynolds Metals Corp. v. Metals Disintegrating Co., 176 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1949).
128. Woods v. Mertes, 9 F.R.D. 318 (D. Del. 1949); see Commentary, Partial
Summary Judgment, 6 FEn. RuLEs SERv. 782 (1943).
129. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE § 56.09 (1938).
130. Coffman v. Federal Laboratories, 171 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1948); Russell v.
Barnes Foundation, 136 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1943).
131. Woods v. Contestabile, 81 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Woods v. Wal-
lace, 8 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1948) ; Creedon v. Evangelista, 77 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.
Pa. 1948) ; Bates v. McClees, 76 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1948) ; Fleming v. Dorsey,
72 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Russell v. Barnes Foundation, 50 F. Supp. 174
(E.D. Pa. 1943).
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In 1947 Rule 56(c) was amended by adding a provision that an in-
terlocutory summary judgment may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone, though there is a genuine issue as to damages. According to the
Advisory Committee on Amendments to the Rules 13 2 the addition was not
meant to change the rule but only to resolve a "doubt" expressed in
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp,133 to the effect that cases depend-
ing upon questions of damage have been "reserved from the summary
judgment process" or at least summary judgment should not be granted
unless the evidence is so clear that "a jury would not be at liberty to dis-
believe it." It is submitted that Justice Jackson's intent was not to pre-
clude the issuance of a summary judgment when the amount of damages
is in question, but rather to focus attention on the need of extraordinary
care in this situation.' 34 Non constat the alleged doubt, cases in the
Third Circuit both before and after the amendment have recognized the
propriety of granting summary judgment on the issue of liability alone.' 35
CONCLUSION
The question of the grant or denial of summary judgment presents
problems incapable of being methodically pigeonholed by the use of black-
letter rules. The institution of the jury as the trier of fact in the common
law has become so crystallized as to produce a large amount of judicial
inertia opposing extensive summary disposition of cases. On the other
hand, impatience with the dilatory aspects of trial practice and the fact
that trial by the court is becoming more popular have probably influenced
the judiciary in the other direction, though it has been recently observed that
crowded trial calendars might be better alleviated by the appointment of
more judges.136 It is submitted that as a minimum the courts ought to
insist that upon motion for summary judgment the opponent produce some
evidentiary matter in contradiction of the movant's case or specify in an
affidavit the reasons why no sources of information are presently available
to him. One of the most valuable adjuncts to the federal procedure is
that extensive means of obtaining information by the taking of depositions,
answers to interrogatories, requests for admissions, etc., have been made
available to any party.'37 Accordingly when the opponent defends on the
ground of unavailability of information there is no reason why he should
not be expected to move for a continuance under Rule 56(f) to gather
132. U.S. CODE CONG. SERV., 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2357 (1946).
133. 321 U.S. 620 (1943).
134. Cf. Chief Justice Stone, dissenting, id. at 629; Commentary, Summary Judg-
inent as to Damages, 7 FED. RuLEs Smnv. 974 (1944).
135. Cases cited note 131 supra.
136. See Colby v. Klune, 13 FED. RuLEs SERV. 56c41, Case 7 (2d Cir. 1949). In
Raitt v. Seltzer, 10 F.R.D. 48 (N.D.N.Y. 1950), it was indicated that the fact that
the trial calendar was not crowded rendered the summary judgment procedure unneces-
sary.
137. See Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: II,
38 Coi- L. REv. 1436, 1456 (1938).
such information. 3 8 Trial ethics in the federal courts have reached such a
stage where it is no longer fashionable to invoke the entire gamut of
delaying tactics, and the objection that the opponent "should not be com-
pelled to disclose his case before trial" should not be countenanced.13 9
Denial of summary judgment in the vague expectation that upon trial a
genuine issue of fact will materialize out of cross-examination or impeach-
ment alone ought not to be practiced. 140
It is not contended that where complicated issues of fact are present
the courts should be free in summarily precluding the opponent. It is still
important that such matter as. is introduced in his behalf be liberally con-
strued, and a rigid application of the rules of evidence seems to be un-
desirable, especially where the testimony proffered is not by an interested
party. It seems hard in any case, however, to justify a denial of summary
judgment predicated on mere pleading allegations, no matter how com-
plicated the issues. Such a practice completely destroys the usefulness
of the procedure. In this respect it should be remembered that even where
complete summary disposition of the case is not possible, the motion serves
ihe very valuable purpose of requiring an order to be made settling the
uncontested issues of fact, thus expediting disposition of the case once it
comes to trial.
Christopher Branda, Jr.
Seller's Recovery When Buyer Repudiates Before Completion of
Manufacture
When a buyer cancels a contract to purchase goods already completed
and in the possession of the seller, the usual measure of damages is the
difference between the contract price and the market price at the time
for performance.' Since the seller can resell for the market price, it is
considered that this measure will adequately recompense him for his loss.
2
Where, however, a person contracts to buy goods from a manufacturer
or distributor and then cancels the sale before manufacture or procure-
138. Compare the New York practice, discussed in SHEINTAG, THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT 83.
139. Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1946); Melville, Sum-
mary Judgment and Discovery, 34 A.B.AJ. 187 (1948).
140. Chandler Laboratories v. Smith, 88 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1950); see
Arenstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (dissenting opinion), 55 YALE L.J.
810 (1946) ; Note, Factors Affecting the Grant or Denial of Summary Judgment, 48
Coi. L. REv. 780, 785 (1948).
1. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 64(3) : "Where there is an available market for the
goods in question, the measure of damages is, in the absence of special circumstances,
showing proximate damage of a greater amount, the difference between the contract
price and the market or current price at the time or times when the goods ought to
have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the
refusal to accept."
2. 2 WILntsToN, SALES § 582 (2d ed. 1924) ; McCoaaicx, DAMAGES § 173 (1935).
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ment is completed, the problem of the seller's measure of recovery becomes
more difficult since the seller does not have the completed goods to resell.
This situation is covered by section 64(4) of the Uniform Sales Act,
which provides that the seller's damages are to be fixed as of the time
of the breach.3 If he continues to manufacture, he cannot increase his
damages thereby. The profit he would have made if the contract had been
completed is to be "considered" in assessing damages.
The purpose of compensatory damages is, of course, to put the in-
jured party in as good a position as he would have been if the contract
had been fully performed.4  It is the purpose of this Note to examine the
adequacy of the seller's remedies in the situation covered by section 64(4)
and, where inadequacies appear, to consider the possibilities of improving
the seller's position by special provisions in his contract with the buyer.
Particular attention will be given to the seller as manufacturer rather than
as distributor.5
MEAsURE OF RECOVERY AS DEVELOPED BY CASES
General Rule.-Section 64(4) provides that the seller's nrnsnective
nrofit will be "considered." 6 In practice, the majority of courts have
done more than merely "consider," holding thatwhen the buyer repudiates
before manufacture or procurement, the seller's profit will be the measure
of damages. ' This is computed by subtracting the estimated cost of manu-
facture, if-the seller is a manufacturer, or the cost of procurement, if he
is a distributor, from the contract price.8  If the seller is to deliver, the
cost of delivery is also subtracted.9 In addition, if the manufacturer has
bought materials with which to carry out the contract, he can recover the
excess of the cost of the materials over their market value at the time
of breach1 0 If manufacture has already begun, he can recover the difference
3. "If, while labor or expense of material amount are necessary on the part of
the seller to enable him to fulfill his obligations under the contract to sell or the sale,
the buyer repudiates the contract or the sale, or notifies the seller to proceed no
further therewith, the buyer shall be liable to the seller for no greater damages than
the seller would have suffered if he did nothing towards carrying out the contract or
the sale after receiving notice of the buyer's repudiation or countermand. The profit
the seller would have made if the contract or the sale had been fully performed shall
be considered in estimating such damages."
4. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 329, comment a (1932).
5. The cases cited will not be restricted to those decided under the Sales Act,
since § 64(4) restates the common law rule in the United States. 2 WsLISTox, SAIus
§580 (2d ed. 1924).
6. The remedy has been made more certain in Pennsylvania by substituting
"allowed for" for "considered." PA. STAT. ANi., tit. 69, § 293 (Purdon 1931).
7. E.g., United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., 249 U.S. 313 (1919); Miami
Cycle Co. v. National Carbon Co., 268 Fed. 46 (6th Cir. 1920) ; Roland v. Rex Mfg.
Co., 49 R.I. 168, 141 AUt. 310 (1928).
8. E.g., Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1899) (distributor) ; Snelling v. Dine, 270
Mass. 501, 170 N.E. 403 (1930) (manufacturer) ; Gelusha v. Scharoun, 87 N.Y.S.2d
381 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (manufacturer).
9. Kingman & Co. v. Western Mfg. Co., 92 Fed. 486 (8th Cir. 1899).
10. E.g., Wood v. Brighton Mills, 297 Fed. 594 (3d Cir. 1924) ; Bullard v. Eames,
219 Mass. 49, 106 N.E. 584 (1914).
between the cost of labor and materials and the amount he can obtain
for the partially completed goods, assuming the cost to be greater. 1
It has been held in some cases that there should be a reasonable de-
duction from the damages for relief from the risk and responsibility of
full performance and for the saving in time.'2 Most courts, however, have
not included this item, perhaps because of the speculative character of
the amount of the deduction and because of a reluctance to give the re-
pudiating buyer this benefit.
Determination of Profit.-Many courts have shown a liberal attitude
as to the awarding of some damages for loss of the seller's prospective
profit,18 but there has been a great deal of difficulty in computing what
the profit would have been.14 The first problem in some cases has been
the determination of the date as of which the cost of manufacture should
bec6mputeid. This is particularly important where, in a period of declin-
ing costs, the contract term is extended and the cost of manufacture is
much lower by the time of the actual breach than it was at the time of the
contract. In such a situation some courts have measured the cost as of
the time of the breach, on the theory that that would give the seller the
profit he would have made if the buyer had given shipping orders at that
time.'3 Others have employed the date the contract was made, thus re-
stricting the seller to the profit he would have made if the order had been
filled immediately after the signing of the contract.' 6 This seems to be
too favorable to the buyer since he is permitted to make a large saving
by repudiating the contract.
Once the date is decided upon, serious problems as to proof of the
cost of manufacture arise. The following quotation from the opinion
in the Wisconsin case of Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Jacobs 17 gives an
indication of the possible difficulties:
11. E.g., Miami Cycle Co. v. National Carbon Co., 268 Fed. 46 (6th Cir. 1920);
Kingman & Co. v. Western Mfg. Co., 92 Fed. 486 (8th Cir. 1899).
12. Forest Products Co. v. Dant, 117 Ore. 637, 244 Pac. 531 (1926) ; Ames Body
Corp. v. Ralph, 211 Ky. 735, 277 S.W. 1028 (1925).
13. In Anderson v. Pan American Motors Corp., 232 Ill. App. 27 (1924), where
the buyer repudiated a contract to buy automobile motors, the trial court found the
damages too conjectural and awarded only nominal damages. The appellate court
reversed, saying, "A recovery may be had for prospective profits when there are any
criteria by which the probable profits can be estimated with reasonable certainty."
Cf. Home Pattern Co. v. Mertz Co., 86 Conn. 494, 86 AtI. 19 (1913).
14. E.g., Quist v. Zerr, 12 Wash. 2d 21, 120 P.2d 539 (1941) ; Georgia Power &
Light Co. v. Fruit Growers Express Co., 55 Ga. App. 520, 190 S.E. 669 (1937);
Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 147 At. 519 (1929).
15. Margaret Mill v. Aycock Hosiery Mills, 20 Tenn. App. 533, 101 S.W.2d 154
(1936) ; Anderson v. Pan American Motors Corp., 232 Ill. App. 27 (1924).
16. Mackintosh & Sons Co. v. Spinell, 125 Misc. 75, 210 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct.
1925). The sale was of cotton yarn at 930 a pound. The cost of manufacture idecreased
from 85.80 to 41.5b, thus increasing the seller's prospective profit from 7.20 to 51.50.
In a case where the difference is so great the cost as of the date when the contract
was extended might be a workable compromise.
17. 170 Wis. 389, 402, 175 N.W. 796, 802 (1920) (upholding a liquidated damages
provision where the buyer breached a contract for the sale of flour).
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"The inherent difficulties of proving the actual damages in a case
such as this are such as in practical effect to preclude a manufacturer
from recovering damages because of the consequent expense and the
disorganization of his business. The removal of auditors, accountants,
managers, and foremen from the business of a large, highly organized
concern during the time necessarily consumed in a trial entails an
expense, in excess of recoverable costs, so great as to prevent in many
cases any reimbursement to a manufacturer."
In another such case there were hundreds of pages of. testimony at the
trial as to whether the plaintiff's plant operated at a profit, whether over-
head should be included in the cost, and if so, what types of overhead.,
.In computing seller's lost profit by subtracting cost from selling price,
this question of overhead costs has been particularly troublesome.
McCormick, supported by the majority of jurisdictions, argues that a pro-
portionate share of the overhead should be included in the cost of manu-
facture.19 Pennsylvania and Georgia courts have taken a greatly modified
view of this problem in that they have not allocated overhead to cancelled
contracts where it could be shown that subsequent to the cancellation there
was no appreciable reduction in the manufacturer's overhead.2 0 This view
appears preferable since an automatic allocation of overhead under such
circumstances and the consequent decreasing of profits will prevent full
compensation for the seller. If the repudiated contract is removed from
the production schedule while the overhead remains the same, the total ex-
pense per remaining unit of production will increase and the profit will
decrease. 21
Where the seller has a contract to furnish the buyer with all his re-
quirements of a commodity for a certain period and the buyer cancels
during the period to buy from another, it has been held that the seller
can recover prospective profits based on the average volume of sales under
18. Anderson v. Pan American Motors Corp., 232 Ill. App. 27 (1924).
19. McComuicx, DAMAGES § 173 (1935); Rantoul Co. v. Claremont Paper Co.,
196 Fed. 305 (1st Cir. 1912); Wilihelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626,
268 N.W. 634 (1936) ; Worrell & Williams v. Kinnear Mfg. Co., 103 Va. 719, 49 S.E.
988 (1905).
20. Georgia Power & Light Co. v. Fruit Growers Express Co., 55 Ga. App. 520,
190 S.E. 669 (1937) (contract to buy at least 20,000 tons of ice a year only partially
performed for two years) ; Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa.
483, 147 At. 519 (1929) (contract for manufacture of pulp repudiated after partial
performance). Cf., Morrow-Smith Co. v. Cleveland Tractor Co., 296 Pa. 377, 145
Atl. 915 (1929).
21. Assume a $200,000 business with a total cost of manufacture exclusive of over-
head of $100,000, total 6verhead of $50,000, and profit of $50,000. A $40,000 contract
is repudiated before completion of manufacture, but the overhead remains the same.
If a proportionate share of overhead, $10,000, is included, the cost of manufacture of
the cancelled goods is $30,000 and S recovers $10,000 in damages. The overhead is
still $50,000, soh total cost of manufacture of the remaining $160,000 worth of goods
is $130,000 and S's profit $30,00. This, with the $10,000 damages, gives S only
$40,000 instead of the $50,000 he would have received if the contract had not been
repudiated or if overhead had not been included in determining the cost of manufacture.
For a more thorough analysis of this problem see 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 563 (1930).
the contract before the repudiation.2 2  This seems to be the most reason-
able basis for determination of lost profits in such a situation.
Mitigation When Materials Are Used for Other Goods.-When the
seller has on hand at the time of the breach materials with which to per-
form the contract and subsequently uses these materials in making other
goods sold at a profit, it has been held that his damages must be miti-
gated by the amount of this profit 2 3 There is also strong support for the
position that, at least where the seller has the capacity to handle more
contracts, he has lost his profit on this particular bargain, and whether
he has disposed of the materials profitably or not has nothing to do with
his damages 2 4 This view seems preferable in most cases since it fully
compensates the seller and avoids the additional complication of deter-
mining the profit on the second sale.25
Other Measures of Damages Applied.-In some of the early Ameri-
can cases in which the seller, a manufacturer, is allowed to recover his
profit, the statement is made that he can do this only where the goods
have no market value, usually because they are specially manufactured
for the buyer. If the goods are staple products with a ready market, he
can only recover the difference between the contract price and the market
value at the time for performance.28
These dicta have been followed, with very doubtful results, in some
cases where the contracts deal with staples.2 7  Where the market value
was above the cost of manufacture, it has been held that with such an
article the seller must mitigate his damages by manufacturing and selling
to a third party.28 On the other hand, another case applied the market
value standard where the market value was much lower than the cost of
manufacture, and as a result the seller recovered much more than his
22. Quist v. Zerr, 12 Wash. 2d 21, 120 P2d 539 (1941) (requirements contract
for gasoline) ; cf., Home Pattern Co. v. Mertz Co., 86 Conn. 494, 86 Ati. 19 (1913)
(profit made on similar transactions in past to be considered in estimating prospective
profit on cancelled contract for dress patterns).
23. Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Co., 121 U.S. 264 (1887) (steel for
rails) ; Johnston v. Pittsburg Marble & Granite Works, 94 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936) (granite for tombstone) ; Isaacs v. Terry & Tench Co., 125 App. Div. 532,
109 N.Y. Supp. 792 (1908) (steel for beams).
24. Laporte Corp. v. Pennsylvania-Dixie Cement Corp., 164 Md. 642, 165 AtI. 195
(1933) (materials for cement) ; Cameron v. White, 74 Wis. 425, 43 N.W. 155 (1889)
(logs for lumber); Eckenrode v. Chemical Co., 55 Md. 51 (1880) (materials for
phosphate).
25. The only exception would be a case such as Baessetti v. Shenango Furnace
Co., 122 Minn. 335, 142 N.W. 322 (1913), where the defendant cancelled a contract
to purchase all the timber on the plaintiff's land and the plaintiff subsequently cut
and sold the lumber to others for approximately the same price. Mitigation would
appear to be in order here.
26. Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Co., 121 U.S. 264 (1887); Todd v.
Gamble, 148 N.Y. 382, 42 N.E. 982 (1896).
27. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Nagle, 275 Fed. 343 (2d Cir. 1921) (steel plates);
Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 248 Mass. 502, 143
N.E. 312 (1924) (coal); Kincaid v. Price, 18 Colo. App. 73, 70 Pac. 153 (1902)
(coal).
28. Kincaid v. Price, supra note 27.
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prospective profit.29 Both of these results seem obviously unfair, the first
to the seller and the second to the buyer.
The use of the market value standard in case of breach before com-
pletion of manufacture seems fair only where the seller has an option either
to manufacture or purchase the goods and the market price goes below
his cost of manufacture.3 0  In such a situation the buyer could not com-
plain since the seller would naturally choose the more profitable alternative.
The market value standard would also be fair where the seller was a dis-
tributor and was free to shop around for the goods.3 1
It has been held in a few cases that where the buyer repudiates when
the goods are partly completed, the seller can recover the contract price
less the value of the partially completed goods at the time of the breach. 2
The courts here seem overly liberal to the seller. If he can dispose of
the goods for the value they are found to have in their incomplete state,
this plus the damages granted will give him the equivalent of the contract
price without the expense of completing the goods.m
Results When Seller Completes Performance.-As previously stated,
the basic idea of the rule of section 64(4) of the Uniform Sales Act is
that the seller cannot recover more in damages than he could have proved
at the time of the buyer's breach 4 The ordinary assumption is, therefore,
that the seller will cease performance when the buyer cancels. In quite
a few cases, however, the seller has continued to manufacture after the
breach. Sometimes the only reason for so doing seems to have been the
hope that the buyer would change his mind or that he could somehow
be held to the bargain.3 5 In such cases the courts ordinarily have followed
strictly the rule that damages cannot be enhanced, allowing the seller only
his anticipated profit plus the loss from costs incurred at breach.
Situations have arisen, however, in which the seller has been allowed
to complete manufacture after the buyer's breach. The commissioners who
formulated the Uniform Sales Act have said of section 64(4) :
29. Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 248 Mass. 502,
1-43 N.E. 312 (1924). Instead of his prospective profit of $12,606.58, the seller recov-
ered $24,665.06.
30. Kellog & Sons, Inc. v. Providence Churning Co., 45 I. 180, 121 Ati. 123
(1923); cf. Fitchburg Yarn Co. v. Hope Webbing Co., 46 R.I. 290, 127 Adt. 148
(1925).
31. Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1899) ; Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal. 2d 382, 115 P.2d
498 (1941).
32. McCall v. Gloucester Lumber Co., 196 N.C. 597, 146 S.E. 579 (1929) ; Shaen-
field v. Hall Safe & Fixture Co., 157 S.W. 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Tufts v.
Lawrence, 77 Tex. 526, 14 S.W. 165 (1890).
33. Assume the contract price to be $100 and S's cost of manufacture $75. B
repudiates after S has spent $20 for labor and materials, and S then disposes of the
materials for $10. These cases would allow S to recover the contract price less the
resale value of the materials or $90. The customary recovery would he $35, the $25
profit plus the $10 loss from labor and materials.
34. See text at note 3 supra.
35. Snelling v. Dine, 270 Mass. 501, 170 N.E. 403 (1930); Roland v. Rex Mfg.
Co., 49 R.I. 168, 141 At. 310 (1928) ; Home Pattern Co. v. Mertz Co., 86 Conn. 494,
86 AtI. 19 (1913).
"This provision does not require the seller to cease performance
in every case. There may be cases where the damage caused by
stopping performance would be greater than that caused by finishing
the necessary work .... In such a case the seller might complete
performance, and recover damages based on complete performance." 3
As an example, the commissioners cite Southern Cotton Oil Co. v.
Heflin. 7 There the plaintiff was manufacturing oil, meal, cake, hulls and
lint out of cotton seed in the same process. The defendant repudiated a
contract to buy cake and meal, and it was held that the plaintiff, who
continued to manufacture, could recover the difference between the con-
tract price and the market value, the measure of damages if the goods had
been completed at the time of the breach.
The Maryland Courts of Appeals allowed the seller to complete the
goods and recover under the market value standard where the goods, if
left in a partially completed state, would have been worthless.3 8 The same
measure of damages was applied in a case of repudiation during manu-
facture in New York, even though the market value was less than the
cost of manufacture, where the goods in question were such as the seller
might have manufactured for the general purposes of his business.8 9
Whether this result was fair to the buyer is not clear since there is no
indication in the opinion as to what the total damages would have been
if the seller had not completed the goods.
Where the goods are nearly completed at the time of breach and thus
there is no "labor or expense of material amount" 40 to be expended, it
has been held that section 64(4) does not apply. The seller can complete
the goods and recover under the market value standard.41 In other cases
involving goods which were nearly completed and which had no available
market value since they were being manufactured specially for the de-
fendant, the seller, in accordance with section 63(3) of the Sales Act,42
has been permitted to finish manufacture and to recover the price.43
36. Commissioners' Note to § 64 in 1A Umnroiu LAws AxNoTATm (1950).
37. 99 Fed. 339 (5th Cir. 1900).
38. Kahn v. Carl Schoen Silk Corp., 147 Md. 516, 128 AUt. 359 (1925). This was
a sale of silk to be woven into various designs and colors. After completion the
seller resold at a price above that of the market and damages were determined by
subtracting the resale from the contract price.
39. Funt v. Schiffman, 115 Misc. 155, 187 N.Y. Supp. 666 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (goods
were coats of regular style).
40. UxnFom SAL s Act § 64(4).
41. Mattison Machine Works v. Nypenn Furniture Co., 286 Pa. 501, 134 Ad. 459
(1926).
42. "Although the property in the goods has not passed, if they cannot readily be
resold for a reasonable price, and if the provisions of section 64(4) are not applicable,
the seller may offer to deliver the goods to the buyer, and if the buyer refuses to
receive them, may notify the buyer that the goods are thereafter held by the seller
as bailee for the buyer. Thereafter the seller may treat the goods as the buyer's and
may maintain an action for the price."
43. Lannom Mfg. Co. v. Strauss Co., 235 Iowa 97, 15 N.W.2d 899 (1944) (shoes
of special sizes nearly completed) ; cf., Chicago Lock Co. v. Kirchner, 199 Wis. 30,
225 N.W. 185 (1929) (only 20 work left on locks worth 584 and price recovered be-
cause of guarantee); Soss Mfg. Co. v. Mitchell Motors Co., 119 Misc. 290, 196 N.Y.
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EVALUATION OF ADEQUACY OF SELLER'S REMEDIES
There is no doubt that the basic rule allowing recovery of anticipated
profits in case of breach before manufacture or procurement is a fair one.
If the seller actually recovers the profit he would have made from full
performance, plus any loss resulting from labor and material already
expended, he has received all he deserves. The real difficulty which
ordinarily raises the possibility of loss to the seller is the problem of
determining just what his profit would have been.
If the court determines fairly the date as of which the cost of manu-
facture is to be determined,44 the seller must next attempt to prove the
amount of his cost of manufacture. If his proof is not very definite, the
trial court may find his profits too speculative and award him only nom-
inal damages.45 If this result is avoided, there is still the troublesome
problem as to whether the overhead should be included in the cost of
manufacture. As has been indicated, a share of overhead may be included
in some cases where all or a part of it should be omitted.
46
In some jurisdictions the seller also is faced with the possibility that
the court will apply the wrong measure of damages. This, as demon-
strated, may prove a benefit to him, but it also may cause him a sizeable
loss. 47
The seller who is a manufacturer faces a particularly perplexing
problem where the buyer repudiates when the goods are partially com-
pleted. Should he finish the goods and try either to resell or sue for the
price, or should he stop work and sue for lost profits? If he finishes and
is able to resell at a favorable price, he has recovered all or most of his
loss, and if not all, the court will probably grant damages based on the
difference between the contract and resale prices.48 If, however, he is not
able to sell the goods, he has increased his expenses greatly and, unless
the goods were nearly completed at the time of repudiation, 49 he will
ordinarily recover only the damages due him at breach. 0
Supp. 304 (1922) (door hinges nearly finished and property held to have passed to
buyer through assent of agent). In a borderline case, Buchman v. Millville Mfg. Co.,
17 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1927), a manufacturer of yarn finished the goods after repudiation
when three-fourths complete, although there was no real market for the yarn. Judge
Learned Hand weighed the factors on both sides, decided the seller had made a rea-
sonable business judgment in completing manufacture, and granted him recovery of
the price under § 63 (3).
44. See notes 15 and 16 supra and text.
45. See note 13 supra.
46. See notes 19 and 20 supra and text.
47. See notes 28 and 29 supra and text.
48. This was done in Kahn v. Carl Schoen Silk Corp., 147 Md. 516, 128 Atl. 359
(1925).
49. See note 43 supra and text at notes 40 to 43. It is doubtful if most courts
under similar facts would grant the seller as liberal a remedy as that in the Buchman
case.
50. See note 35 supra and text.
It has been maintained persuasively that even if the seller completes
manufacture and is allowed to recover on the basis of his resale price, he
is not fully compensated if the resale price is higher than his cost of manu-
facture.' 1 Since he has had to make a second sale, he has diminished the
number of prospective customers by one and has really lost his profit on
the first sale, not just the difference between the contract and resale
prices. 52 Although theoretically sound, the difficulty in enforcing this basis
for damages is that it would increase the number of cases in which there
would have to be a determination, with all its attendant difficulties, of the
seller's profit. Nevertheless, it is true that the manufacturer in this
situation is not fully compensated for the loss caused by the buyer's breach,
and a seller should be allowed to recover his lost profit if he is willing and
able to prove the amount.
POSSIBILITY OF AID FOR SELLER THROUGH CONTRACT PROVISIONS
It is evident from a consideration of the foregoing problems and pos-
sible inequities that the seller in a case of breach before manufacture has
a legitimate interest in trying to make his remedy certain. It might be
helpful, therefore, to investigate the possibilities of aid for the seller
through provisions of his contract with the buyer. Two types of clauses
have been employed to some extent, those providing in effect that the
contract cannot be cancelled and liquidated damage clauses.
Clauses Against Cancellation.-Of these the more common in con-
tracts for most types of manufacture have been the clauses against can-
cellation. Such a provision, if given full effect by the court, simply means
that despite the buyer's repudiation, the seller can ship the goods and
recover the price. The buyer has thus waived his implied right to breach
and answer in damages.
53
As to the validity of this clause, the sections of the Sales Act are in
conflict. Section 71 provides:
"Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a con-
tract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or
varied by express agreement."
Under section 19(4) (1), however, the buyer must assent to the appro-
priation of goods to the contract, before the passage of title and resultant
51. 2 WmmsToN, SAEs § 583a (2d ed. 1924) ; Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 1360, 1371
et seq. (1948). See cases cited note 24 supra.
52. Suppose S manufactures an article for $40 and contracts to sell it to B for
$60. If this contract is performed and S also makes a subsequent sale of the same
product to T for $50, S has made $30. If, however, B repudiates and then S sells to
the second customer for $50, his damages are held to be the difference between the
contract and resale prices or $10, giving S a total of $20 profit. Thus, unless S could
sell the full capacity of his plant despite this loss of a customer, he has really lost $10.
53. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAmv. L. Rv. 457, 462 (1897).
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liability of the buyer occurs.5 4 Also the provision of section 64(4) against
enhancement of damages is opposed to a denial of the right of repudia-
tion.5 5 The issue is basically, therefore, whether the desirability of cer-
tainty of damages and the policy in favor of allowing contracting parties
to set their own terms should override the orthodox doctrines of title and
mitigation of damages.
A review of the cases which have considered such clauses shows that
the reaction of the courts has varied with the relative definiteness and
clearness of purpose of the clauses. When it is stated simply that the
contract "is not subject to cancellation," a common provision in many
order forms,5 6 the courts ordinarily have either ignored the clause com-
pletely; 57 have interpreted it as meaning merely that the buyer could not
cancel the contract without being liable in damages; 58 or, while interpret-
ing it as a promise not to countermand, have denied it effect. 50
When, however, the intention that the contract should not be can-
celled and the consequences of an attempt to cancel are spelled out more
clearly, the tendency of the courts has been to give effect to the clause.
The least detailed clause found to which some effect has been given was
used in the Pennsylvania case of Mattison Machine Works v. Nypenn
Furniture Company.60 There it was held that an attempted repudiation
by the buyer before completion was not effective because of the clause,
"It is expressly agreed that this order shall not be countermanded." 61
The seller was allowed to complete manufacture and recover the difference
between the contract and resale prices. This was not, however, the only
ground of the decision, since the goods were nearly completed at the
time of the repudiation, and therefore, the court held that section 64(4)
did not apply.
6 2
In New Jersey, the Court of Errors and Appeals allowed the seller
to recover the price in an ordinary contract of sale because of the clause:
54. "Where there is a contract to sell unascertained or future goods by descrip-
tion, and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appro-
priated to the contract, either by the seller with the assent of the buyer, or by the
buyer with the assent of the seller, property in the goods thereupon passes to the
buyer."
55. See note 3 supra.
56. See acknowledgment of order printed in Stolteben v. General Foods Corp.,
79 F. Sifpp. 228, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
57. Stolteben v. General Foods Corp., supra note 56.
58. Shaenfield v. Hall Safe & Fixture Co., 157 S.W. 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
(no right to breach in absence of clause and breach had same effect with it as with-
out it) ; but cf., Lewis v. Scoville, 94 Conn. 79, 108 Ati. 501 (1919) (seller allowed to
recover price but apparently on basis of English rule that seller is not restricted to
damages unless he acquiesces in repudiation).
59. Knight & Bostwick v. Moore, 203 Wis. 540, 234 N.W. 902 (1931).
60. 286 Pa. 501, 134 Atl. 459 (1926).
61. Id. at 503, 134 Atl. at 459; see Green & Sons v. Lineville Drug Co., 167 Ala.
372 (1910) ; ef. Hauer v. Martin, 284 Pa. 407, 131 Atl. 187 (1925) (contract for per-
sonal services).
62. See notes 40 and 41 supra and text.
"Upon refusal or neglect of the vendee to accept the property
when tendered by the vendor or its agent the full amount unpaid
hereon shall become due and payable forthwith." 63
A more detailed clause was employed by the seller, a manufacturer, in
a Wisconsin case: 64
"If the purchaser shall instruct the company not to ship the
material, the company may at its option either hold the goods for the
purchaser or deliver the material to a common carrier consigned to
the purchaser, and either action on the part of the company shall be
considered as full performance of the contract by the employer."
Even though the buyer notified the seller of cancellation a month before
shipment, the seller was allowed to recover the price. The court held
that the provision was a waiver under section 71 of the Sales Act of the
buyer's implied right in section 64(4) to cancel the contract.65
In another case, Jonesboro Compress Co. v. Mente & Co.,66 a clause
provided that if the buyer did not give shipping instructions within a
certain time, the seller could recover the price while keeping possession
of and title to the goods until he had received payment. The buyer gave
no shipping orders and the court enforced the clause to the letter, giving
the seller the price without the necessity of giving up the goods until
payment was received. 67 This result prevents the increase of expense
and loss of seller's lien which may result if seller ships, and appears to be
in line with section 56(2) of the Sales Act, which provides, "The unpaid
seller of goods, having a lien thereon, does not lose his lien by reason
only that he has obtained judgment or decree for the price of the goods."
The conclusion seems to be that where the clause is clear and definite,
many courts will enforce a provision that if the buyer attempts to cancel,
the seller may recover the price of the goods if he ships or is prepared to
ship the goods.68  The courts do not ordinarily discuss the doctrines of
title and mitigation of damages, but stress the importance of allowing the
63. Wales Adding Machine Co. v. Huver, 98 N.J.L. 910, 911, 121 AtI. 621, 622
(1923) ; cf. Owen-Fields, Inc. v. Sudow, 67 S. Dak. 297, 292 N.W. 110 (1940).
64. Renne v. Volk, 188 Wis. 508, 510, 205 N.W. 385, 385 (1925).
65. The subsequent Wisconsin case of Knight & Bostwzck v. Moore reached the
opposite result without mentioning Renne v. Volk, but it is possible to distinguish the
cases on the basis of the great tifference in the clauses used. See note 59 supra and
text.
66. 72 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1934).
67. The same clause was held invalid in Mente & Co. v. Fresno Compress &
Warehouse Co., 113 Cal. App. 325, 298 Pac. 126 (1931), under statutory provisions
that a contract fixing the amount to be recovered in case of breach is void unless it
is extremely difficult to fix the damages. The court seemed to be under the mistaken
impression that the clause granted the seller both recovery of the price and permanent
possession of the goods.
68. See Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract, 15 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rxv. 159, 199
(1938). The author suggests the use of the following provision: "The price under
this contract is agreed to be due at the expiration of the agreed credit term, calculated
from the date when seller ships or offers to ship the goods; but should the buyer mail
or otherwise communicate his intention to break the contract, the seller may cancel
the credit term and declare the price due at once."
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parties to set their own terms, particularly since the aim is the desirable
one of full performance.69
No case has been found in which, under a manufacturing contract
containing such a provision, the buyer repudiated before manufacture and
the seller tried to recover the price after completing the goods. It is prob-
able that many courts, otherwise favorable to no-cancellation clauses,
would, under these circumstances, restrict the seller's recovery to his
anticipated profit. Such a clause, however, assuming the goods contracted
for to be staples with a ready market, might well be effective to allow the
seller to manufacture, resell to a third party, and recover the difference
between the contract and resale prices. The immediate resale would avoid
the possibility of high storage charges accumulating during litigation in
an action for the price, charges which would increase either the damages
paid by the buyer or the seller's loss, depending on who won the case.
It would seem then that one of the seller's best chances to increase
the certainty of his damages would be through a clearly worded provision
that after repudiation by the buyer, the seller may complete manufacture,
if this will not unreasonably increase the damages, declare the price
due, and sell the goods for the buyer's account, recovering from the buyer
the difference between the contract and resale prices. Furthermore, if
the seller is not operating at full capacity and is willing to bear the burden
of proof as to cost of manufacture, he may provide that in cases where the
resale price is more than the seller's cost of manufacture, his recovery
would be the lost profit on the original sale. Only by this recovery would
he be fully compensated for the loss incident to the breach. 70
Liquidated Damage Provisions.7 1-Liquidated damage clauses in con-
tracts to manufacture have been employed much less generally than those
prohibiting cancellation. They have, however, been used extensively in
the flour industry. This is primarily due to the fact that many flour
manufacturers use the standard "Millers' National Federation Uniform
Sales Contract," which includes in it a liquidated damages provision.72
This clause does not stipulate a lump sum as damages, but provides a
method of computation based upon the expense of holding the wheat, the
cost of selling, and the difference between the purchase and resale prices
69. "The primary idea or purpose of a present valid executory contract is future
full performance by all parties to it. That being the real reason for its existence, we
see no good grounds upon which we could hold that parties may not contract in ad-
vance that they will not assert or maintain certain conditions which, in the absence
of provisions to the contrary, have been and are recognized as incident to executory
contracts. If one may waive substantial rights such as are guaranteed to him by the
Constitution, we can see no logical reason for saying that he may not . . . waive
that which is a mere condition attached by statute or rule of law to a contract which is
itself silent on the subject." Renne v. Volk, 188 Wis. 508, 510, 205 N.W. 385, 386
(1925).
70. See notes 51 and 52 supra and text.
71. The Uniform Sales Act has no provision regarding liquidated damages.
72. See Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal. 2d 382, 115 P.2d 498, 500 (1941).
of the wheat.73  This clause and ones very similar to it have been upheld
as valid in whole or in part in many jurisdictions. 4
The assumption in the flour cases is that the seller will purchase wheat
shortly after the contract is made, and will carry it until the flour is manu-
factured when the buyer furnishes shipping instructions. 75 The fact that
the price of wheat fluctuates greatly has been stressed, therefore, as a
cause of uncertainty in the seller's damages and a reason for validating
the above provision. 76 In supporting the same clause, in more general
terms, another court stated:
"There is a distinct trend toward a relaxation of the rules as to
liquidated damages .... In the complexities of modern business,
breaches of contract involve more incidental but real damages than
when business was less complicated; in later years, business men and
associations of business men have been more desirous of contracting
as to damage, in order that their liability may be a known rather
than an unknown quantity. Responding to these changing conditions
in the business world, the courts have been much less reluctant than
formerly to enforce provisions for liquidated damages." 77
It has been said, and it would seem properly so, that the liquidated
damage provision could not be applied if the buyer repudiated before the
seller had incurred the expense of purchasing wheat for the contract.
78 It
has also been held that liquidated damages will not be granted where the
seller is a distributor, since the amount of damages can be easily deter-
mined.79
Few cases have been found outside of the flour industry in which
contracts to manufacture contained provisions for liquidated damages. In
one of these the court allowed the seller to recover under a clause which
provided for damages of twenty per cent of the contract price if the buyer
73. If the buyer fails to furnish shipping instructions, the seller may recover:
(1) Y3 per day per barrel of flour from the date of the sale to the date of termination
as carrying expense; (2) 200 per barrel as the cost of selling; (3) plus or minus the
difference between the market value of a bushel of wheat on the date of sale and on
the date of termination, multiplied by 4.6 times the number of barrels of flour, 4.6
being the amount of wheat needed to make one barrel of flour. The provision is
quoted in full in Quaile & Co. v. Kelly Milling Co., 184 Ark. 717, 43 S.W.2d 369 (1931)
(denying recovery of the cost of selling but allowing other two grounds).
74. E.g., Christian Mills v. Berthold Stem Flour Co., 247 Ill. App. (1927);
Yerxa v. Domestic Science Baking Co., 95 Ohio St. 180, 115 N.E. 1014 (1917) (2#
a bushel for loss of profit added, but lower rate on other items). Such clauses have
also been held valid in Alabama, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin.
75. Quaile & Co. v. Kelly Milling Co., 184 Ark. 717, 43 S.W.2d 369 (1931);
Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Domestic Science Baking Co., 170 Wis. 389, 175 N.W.
796 (1920).
76. Cases cited note 75 supra.
77. Larabee Flour Mills Co. v. Carignano, 49 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1931).
78. See Quaile & Co. v. Kelly Milling Co., 184 Ark. 717, 724, 43 S.W.2d 369
(1931).
79. Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal. 2d 382, 115 P.2d 498 (1941). Contra: Hosmer Co. v.
Paramount Cone Co., 285 Mass. 278, 189 N.E. 192 (1934).
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countermanded the whole order.80 There was, however, no discussion in
the opinion as to the fairness of the damages granted.
In two other cases the seller was to recover a certain percentage of
the contract price if the buyer cancelled all or any part of the order.
81
The courts in both instances held the provisions to be penalties, since the
same sum would be received whether the part of the order repudiated was
large or small. The amount recoverable under the clause was, as a matter
of fact, substantially less in one of the cases than the damages actually
suffered, and the court held that the seller could recover his actual
damages.
82
The rationale of the courts in these cases seems obviously correct as
to clauses in which a lump sum is to be recovered as damages whether
the breach is total or partial. If the sum is to be recovered only in case of
total breach, the liquidated damages clause should still be invalid if the
seller cannot resell for any substantial amount because the goods are being
made to buyer's peculiar specifications. In such a case the seller's dam-
ages would vary so much, depending on the stage of production at the
time of repudiation, that any single sum would rarely be a fair liquidation
of damages. There would appear to be no legal objection, however, to a
provision that the seller should recover a certain percentage of the con-
tract price approximating the profit he ordinarily obtains on such a sale,
and that the remaining damages, resulting from expenditures incurred
prior to the breach, should be computed in the usual way.
Where the order is for staple goods with a ready market, the agree-
ment could combine elements of both no-cancellation and liquidated dam-
age clauses, providing that upon repudiation seller may complete the
goods, resell, and then recover a percentage of the contract price as his
lost profit.s3 It is possible also that reasonable formulas such as that
employed in the flour industry might be evolved in other types of manu-
facture to give a more exact approximation of the seller's lost profit in
such cases. In determining the exact method to be used in arriving at
the seller's anticipated profit, it should be borne in mind that such agree-
ments may later be scrutinized by the courts. Consequently, sufficient
detail should be incorporated within the agreement to preclude a court
determination that the clause was a penalty provision.
PROSPECTS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Some of the inadequacies of present sales law in the field of seller's
damages are recognized in the proposed Uniform Commercial Code. The
80. Tidwell v. Southern Engine & Boiler Works, 87 Ark. 52, 112 S.W. 152
(1908).
81. Mansur & Tebbetts Implement Co. v. Tissier Arms & Hardware Co., 136
Ala. 597, 33 So. 818 (1902) (forty-seven carriages, buggies and phaetons) ; Palestine
Ice, Fuel & Gin Co. v. Connally & Co., 148 S.W. 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (a
ginning machine with many parts).
82. Palestine Ice, Fuel & Gin Co. v. Connally & Co., supra note 81.
83. Such a provision, if enforced, would fully compensate the seller by giving him
the profit on both sales without the problems of proof in court. See text at notes 52
and 70.
first change to be noted is the relaxation of the requirement of mitigation
of damages where the buyer breaches before the completion of procure-
ment or manufacture. If in the seller's "reasonable commercial judg-
ment," the completion will not "materially increase the damages," he may
complete the goods and appropriate them to the contract.
8 4
This is in line with the Code's increased stress on the importance of
resale by the seller to make his damages certain. Under the Uniform
Sales Act the resale price was considered to be merely evidence of the
market value,8 5 but the new act definitely provides:
"Where the resale is made in good faith and with reasonable
care and judgment the seller may recover the difference between the
resale price and the contract price." 86
This means that the manufacturer of goods, which could be resold for a
price approximately as high as his probable cost of manufacture, could
complete the goods and recover the difference between the contract and
resale prices. This would avoid the difficulties of proving his cost of
manufacture in court.
87
The Code is silent as to the seller's measure of damages if he chooses
not to complete the goods, but it is assumed that the courts would continue
to award him his lost profit.
As to the efficacy of no-cancellation and liquidated damage clauses
under the Uniform Code, the principles for dealing with them are spelled
out more clearly than in the Uniform Sales Act, but it is doubtful if such
clarifications will result in any significant change in the decisions. The
Code provides that the court may strike any unconscionable clause and
enforce the rest of' the contract, but the decision as to what is unconscion-
able is a matter of the court's discretion."8 A section on liquidation of
damages is added which is merely a statement of the existing law:
"Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of
the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties
of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise
obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large
liquidated damages is void as a penalty." 89
CoNcLusI N
It is evident then that there will continue to be difficulties as to the
granting of a fair recovery t6 the seller when the buyer repudiates before
84. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (May 1949 Draft).
85. 2 WLLIsToN, SALES § 550 (2d ed. 1924).
86. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-706. (May 1949 Draft).
87. The objection that the manufacturer has lost a sale and should really recover
his profit in this situation is valid under the Code also, but assuming no liquidated
damage clause, this weakness seems inevitable if certainty of damages is to be had.
88. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (May 1949 Draft).
89. Id. § 2-720.
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the completion of manufacture. The recovery of lost profit, as provided
by the Uniform Sales Act, appears equitable, but problems as to deter-
mination of that profit will still arise. Also, there will always be a danger
of the misapplication of remedy. The Uniform Commercial Code at-
tempts to meet these problems by its stress on certainty of damages in
allowing the seller greater freedom to complete and resell the goods. It is
believed that widespread adoption of the Code, combined with more fre-
quent use of reasonable no-cancellation and liquidated damage provisions
of the types suggested in this Note, will go far toward eliminating many
of the inequities and uncertainties currently existing in the determination
of seller's damages in cases of repudiation before completion.
E. H. Heisler.
